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SIXTII lVIEETING. 63 
by outlining the divergent French views, and the chairman had 
presented the American thesis in an interesting and voluminous 
document. He could testify to . the profound interest aroused 
among the French delegation by Lord Lee's speech and to the 
force of his arguments, which if not convincing were highly im~ 
pressive. He ( 1\Ir. Sarraut) and his colleagues felt that the best 
tribute which they could pay to Lord Lee's able address would be 
to -reply to it in detail. He requested, therefore, that time might 
be given to prepare this reply and also secure a translation of the 
document presented by the chairman, and that the meeting be 
adjourned until Friday afternoon. 
The chairman asked what was the pleasure of the ·committee in 
this matter. 
1\Ir. Balfour said that he placed himself in the chairman's hands. 
After some discussion it was agreed to meet Friday afternoon, 
December 23, 1921, at . 3 p. m., and that the statement to the 
press should embody such portions of the remarks made at the 
present sessions as the respective delegates shm;tld communicate 
to the secretary general. 
The meeting then adjourned until December 23, 1921, 3 p. m. 
SIXTH MEETING-FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1921, 3 P. M. 
PRESENT. 
United States.-Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by :Mr. 
:\Yright, 1\Ir. Clark. 
British En~pire.-1\lr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Aul\_land Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir .. Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zea~ 
land), 1\Ir. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Han~ 
key, Capt. Little, Capt Domvile, Mr. Mousley. 
France.-l\Ir. Sarraut, J.\tlr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by l\Ir. I{ammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, 
l\Ir. Ponsot. 
JtaZy.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi~Ricci, Senator Alber-
tini, Vice Admiral Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-
Venosta, Count Pagliano, Comm~nder Prince Ruspoli, l\lr. Celesia 
di Vegliasco. 
Japan.-Prince Tokugawa, J.\tlr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral I{ato, 
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. . 
The secretary general~ assisted by 1\lr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, 
and 1\Ir. \Vilson. 
Interpreters, 1\Ir. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon. 
64- FREKCH STATEMENT. 
1. The sixth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma-
. . 
ment \Vas held in the Columbus Room of the Pan-American Union 
Building at 3 p. m., December 23, 1921. 
2. There were present: For the United States, l\ir. Hughes, Sen-
ator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, ·dol. Roosevelt, Admiral 
qoontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, L~rd Lee, Sir Auck-
land Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden 
(for Canada), Senatot Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond 
(for Ne\V Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sar-
raut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator 
Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Acton; for japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral 
I\:ato, Capt. Uyeda. 
3. The following secretaries and technical advise~.s were pres-
~nt: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; fb~~ the British 
Empire, Sir Maurice Han~ey, Capt. Littl~, . Capt~ bornvne-, Mr. 
Mousley; for France, Mr. I\::am;merer, Mr. DenaJnt, Capt. Oden-
d'hal, Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count 
Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli,. Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco; 
for Japan, l\ifr. Ichihashi. 1 
The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, 
and 1\ir. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon 
(interpreters) were also present. 
4. The chairman, l\1r. Hughes, suggested that the discussion 
should continue from the point where it had stopped the day be-
fore. 
Admiral de Bon said that he desired in the first place to make a 
statement for the sake of accuracy. In the course of yesterday's 
session different estimates of the French submari,ne tonnage were 
given by Mi". Hughes and Lord Lee. This difference seemed to 
him to arise in part from the fact that in one case the tonnage 
·was estimated on submerged submarines and in the other on 
ships on the surface. 
France posseses at the present time 50 submarines representing 
a tonnage of 31,391 tons if estimated afloat and of 42,949 tons .if 
estimated when submerged. These figures did not include the 12 
submarines whose construction had been authorized by Parlia-
ment and for which contracts had been made. 
Admiral de Bon then read the following statement:. 
"The conference entered yesterday upon the consideration of 
the question of abolishing submarines. It had listened to a re-
markable statement and defense of the British point of view by 
Lord Lee, of Fareham. The argument presented is very complete 
and very logical, and it may be said tha!. it supports the view 
favoring abolition of the submarine with the most forcible argu-
ments that can be brought to bear upon this side of the question. 
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"Another consideration of this particularly remarkable and im-
portant quesfion was read by Chairman Hughes, and even if he 
had not had the kindness to enlighten the conference upon _ the 
distinguished personality of the members of the advisory com-
mittee, the incontestable value of their arguments would have sig-
nalized their exceptional ability. 
"The conclusion of this dissertation is the reverse of the view 
adYocated by the Ron. Lord Lee, of Fareham, and is in favor of 
the preservation of the submarine. . 
"The two declarations that have been made have brought to 
light a·bout all the argti.nients-that can be advanced. Accordingly,. 
it would seem as if the de15'ate might almost be regarded as ex-
hausted if we did not have certain differences of opinion regard-
ing the various arguments \vhich it would seem desirable to pre-
sent to the conference. 
" I ask perm:ssion to review them briefly before you. 
" In the first place, it has been denied that the submarine was 
really an efficient weapon, and this is · an essent~al consideration,. 
since, if this were admitted, it is obvious that there would be al-
most no reason for building submarines. 
" The submarine as a weapon against warships can not be con-
sidered useless. If it is, indeed, true that the Great Fleet was 
able to remain at sea during several months in the midst of the 
submarines without any of its ships being hit, it should be re-
membered that France lost three battleships and five cruisers and 
bad several other ships torpedoed, 130,000 tons in all. To this 
list I can add a certain number. of battleships lost by Great Britain 
and by Italy. 
"Finally, the offensive action of the submarines has necessitated 
the construction of a considerable defensive system, and this cer-
tainly had an influence toward weakening the general forces .. of 
the nations engaged. 
"As a means of defense the submarine has not been found use-
less. It can not, I think, be denied that if Germany maintained 
her coast intact it was not solely because of the barrier of mines 
with which she ·protected it. This could have been crossed by any 
force suitably provided with mine sweepers if a- force of subma-
rines, supplementary to the mine defenses, had not rendered the 
approach to them really dangerous. · 
" In the Adriatic the submarine also formed one of the most 
powerful means of action for the enemy. 
" In the Dardanelles the Allies felt the effect of the use of sub-
marines not only during the major actions but also throughout the 
long months during which they remained holding tight to tile 
point of Gallipoli Peninsu~a. The bombardments which the Allies 
were led to make against the Turkish position were always con-
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:siderably hindered by the measures for protecting their ships 
which they were compelled to take on account of the presence or 
threat of submarines in those waters. The Allies had, moreover, 
paid for their efforts with the loss of several ships. 
"In fighting warships the submarine can be employed as a 
:scout, or rather as an observation post. 
"Everyone knows the great extent to which the submarine 
lends itself in wireless communications. It is obvious that this 
observation post, so difficult to detect, can approach very near to 
the enemy, watch his ope.rations, and carry either to the fleet 
which it is convoying or to its governing authority information 
-which can not otherwise be obtained, especially for navies which 
l1ave no powerful surface craft at their disposal. 
"In a word, in our opinion, the submarine has proven its 
worth as a means of attack against warships as well as in the pro-
tection of coasts. 
"The submarine has shown itself especially efficient against the 
merchant marine. 
" I need not recall the very consider~ble results obtained in the 
submarine \varfare waged by Germany against the c.ommercial 
fleets of the world. The mind ~an not return without ' horror to 
this subject, which bas struck terror to all peoples. 
" But what causes this terror is .not the fact that the German 
submarines attacked the merchant vessels of their enemies, but 
that they did not respect either the neutral flag or steamers loaded 
with nonbelligerents, or even the transports for the wounded 
which should pave been protected by the Red Cross flag, which 
flag, however, even on land, they ·often saw fit to violate. It has 
always been admissible to attack the enemy's merchant marine, 
and it will, I think, always seem legitimate to do so. In fact, it 
js one of the 1nost effective means of seriously crippling one's 
adversary. 
"If, taking an extreme case, one might consider it possible to 
bring one's adversary to the point of yielding by this process, 
would it not be less cruel and less wasteful of human life _than 
military. operations which would arrive at the same result by di-
rect application-of force? 
"One may protest against this interpretation, but it is the re-
sult of the blockade, which is a legitimate practice, and its effects 
are not peculiar to submarines. 
"I understand quite well that if this kind of war is .allowed, it. 
should be confined within certain limits to prevent it from violat-
ing the laws of humanity. That is the precise point on which the 
charge that all have agreed in bringing without mercy against the 
Germans is based. But the accusation is brought against the men 
and not against the instrument that they made use of. 
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"In order to impart to the war, which they had decided on, the 
horrible character which they thought would cause our energies 
to yield, the Germans simply sank the boats which they stopped. 
You will recall that at the beginning of the submarine campaign 
the Germans aimed, aboYe all, to inspire terror and expected to 
obtain from it a moral effect on which they based their hopes. In 
fact, nobody can haYe forgotten the propaganda launched at the 
beginning of 1915 \Yith all the mighty and wily means of German 
propaganda. It aimed alnwst exclusively at a moral effect. It 
1vas only later on that they took into consiperation the material 
results which could be surely secured by submarine attacks 
against commercial fleets and that they enlarged progressively 
their acts of piracy. 
" If it is undeniable that Germany made a frightful and aston-
ishing misuse of the submarine against commercial fleets, can 
one contend that it would haYe been impossible for her to act 
Qtherwise? 
" l\foreover, did not the Germans misuse, anq to excess, prac-
tically all their other weapons? 
" In the first place, one can not deny that they could have 
avoided attacks against neutral ships and could have refrained 
from torpedoing passenger ships without warning, especially hos-
pital ships. 
"The success of their fight might have been materially lessened, 
but they would certainly haYe gained from a moral viewpoint and 
the German submarines would not have lost the resi?ect of the 
-civilized world. 
"And then is it not permissible to think that war against 
enemy merchant ships could have been waged differently? Sup-
pose, for instance, that in meeting a merchant ship a submarine 
advised her that she would be destroyed as soon as security for 
the crew was assured, either by proximity to the shore or by 
means of relief. It could prescribe a route to the ship and bring 
it to a safe place where it would sink it after having removed 
the crew. 
"That is merely a Bupposltion, and I will not attempt here to 
formulate a doctrine, but you will find in it a thought similar to 
that which guided the sailors of other days when they were mak-
ing a pri?:e and taking it to port or until it had been taken from 
them by the enemy. 
" It may be said that the submarine would be exposed to great 
risks, but were not the frigates and the corsairs of other days 
exposed to great risks in sin1ilar operations? How 1nany of them 
had perished either in the defense of their capture or because 
they had been unable to escape the attacks of their enemies in the 
.course of the voyage? 
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"Certainly the fruits of submarine warfare would have been 
smaller if they had been obliged to confine themselves to the limits 
of honorable warfare, but it is in1possible to claim that there 
would have been none. 
"I know very well that to sink a ship even while saving the 
lives of those on board is a questionable act and may be inad-
missible. This is a question of law which ought to be settled 
by confining such action to cases of absolute necessity. 
" In passing I would call your attention to the fact that the 
cruel use to which . the Germans put their submarines was not 
confined to this type of vessels. They seized merchant vessels 
and, in order to turn them into cruisers, immediately armed 
then1, keeping their crews on board and thus forcing them to 
take part in naval engagements, a prac.tice which while less in-
human th~n that inflicted on the crews that were abandoned on 
the high seas was nevertheless indefensible. 
"It follows from this that the activities of submarines against 
merchant VeSSelR Should be COnfined Within limits that WOUld 
render their USl legitimate. A proper set of rules ought to be 
drawn up with this object in view. They should be adopted 
whenever a revision of the rules for applying international law, 
not only with regard to submarines but to all life at sea in time 
of war, was undertaken. 
"Submarine activity against the enemy's merchant fleet might 
be very effective. We have not been able to listen 'vithout great 
emotion as Lord.Lee recalled the hours of anguish that all those 
who had held the guidance of affairs during the war had known 
and lived through when Great Britain, together at time with 
France, was threatened with being depriv~d of the supplies 
which were indispensable not merely for continuing the struggle 
but to keep the nation alive. 
"This is the consEcration of the power of the submarine when 
exerted to the full extent of its destructive possibilities, without 
regard for the limits imposed by the most rudimentary princi-
ples of humanity and respect for international law. Submarine 
activity ag~inst enemy transports and convoys, within the limits 
fixed by these considerations which should remain sacred to hon-
orable opponents, can still be of great importance. It can be 
included among the legitimate methods of warfare as a useful 
factor, especially for nations 'vhich have not a powerful navy. 
" In this connection another consideration occurs to me. It is 
said that the submarine can n.ever be kept from bursting through 
the moral barrier which ought to lin1it its activities. It will 
always yield to the temptation to make unrestricted use of all its 
powers. Lord Lee has kindly paid the submarine officers and 
crews of all navies the compliment of stating that he believed 
thenl incapable of the acts imputed to the German submarines. 
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All naval men would be grateful to him. nut the honorable first 
lord fears that officers and men rnay be confronted by formal 
orders fr01n their GoYernrnents, which may be driven by danger 
into the weakness · of issuing such orders. He does not think 
any Government ·would risk hereafter incurring such a responsi-
hility. He thinks furthermore that if ever a nation were again 
to be capable of making such an error, it would not hesitate to 
cornmit analogous excesses with other means, for example, with 
air forces which could fill the world with even greater horrors. 
"Against the possibility of a Government erring to such a point, 
all measures the conference may take would be in vain. The 
submarine is useful for fighting war fleets; it is useful for 
fighting merchant vessels. Our opinion is that it is especially 
the weap~n of nations not having a large navy. It is, in fact, 
a comparatively cheap element in naval warfare, which can 
he procured in large numbers at a cost far below that of capital . 
ships. 
"At the time when we are occupied above all with economic 
questions, to the point that· we are willing to glive them prece-
dence over considerations of the safety of nations, this seems, in 
the first place, an argument worth remembering. It must he 
observed, however, that in the formation of a counter submarine 
fleet the experience of the past war has brought out the fact that 
we can utilize a considerable number of elements drawn front 
both the merchant and fishing fleets. 
"The expense of providing the necessary measures of defense 
against submarine attack may be notably reduced by this means. 
" Moreover, this is an argurnent of a general nature and applies 
to every other naval weapon, from which, in my opinion, the 
submarine, as we view it now, does not greatly differ. 
"It seems, in fact, that henceforth the submarine has the right 
to figure as an integral part of naval forces. 
"'Vhen it first made its appearance no one knew to what precise 
use it might be put. 
"Even the Germans themselves, who in 1914 were several years 
in advance of other navies as regards submarines, did not fully 
realize what use they would make of them. Almost two years of · 
war went by before they definitely decided upon their plan of 
action, because their submarines had not yet been perfected. 
" If it was not possible at that time to determine the use which 
might be made of the subn1arine, the means for combating its 
activity were still more completely unknown. Unless one has been 
embroiled in such circumstances, it is difficult tQ appreciate the 
formidable effort which was necessary to discover the indis-
pensable measures for destroying the submarine and to execute 
them in the midst of so violent a war, which had up to that 
70 :MEETING SUB~IARIKE ~IENACE. 
time absorbed all.the vital energies of the nations in the struggle 
upon land. 
"However it may be, if this s1nall craft committed frightful 
depredations, it was not alone because the use made of it was 
barbarous in the extreme but largely because during many long 
months there was almost nothing with which it could be combated. 
"At the end of the war the situation was changed, and when 
the armistice came the ravages of the submarines had been 
greatly lessened; the monthly destruction of merchant ships 
scarcely exceeded 60,000 tons, and the methods then in prepara-
tion for coping with the danger would have considerably re-
duced this, while the number of submarines destroyed had been 
steadily increasing. 
" To sum up, in judging the submarine it should not tl"e consid-
ered at the time of the 'var, and above all at that precise moment 
of the war when it was at the height of its effectiveness, but more 
in perspective and looking somewhat toward the future. As is 
the case with every new weapon, it first came upon its ad-
versaries when they were without sufficient defense and caused 
vast damage. Yet from now on, as Lord Lee emphasized, its 
power would be greatly limited; the risks of destruction which 
it must run have become very numerous. Without going as far 
as the first lord in feeling that the submarine has become ineffec-
tive against its foes, it is possible to think that the struggle 
against the submarine may now be carried on under conditions 
comparable to that of any action between warships. 
"A new phase has been reached in the life of the submarine ; 
it will not be the last ... There is rio doubt that further great 
progress will be made in two directions-in the power of attack 
of the submarine and in the efficiency of methods for combating its 
operations. 
" In order to establish certainty upon this point it is enough to 
recall the case of the torpedo boat. Upon its appearance this lit-
tle craft was considered an instru1nent of such power of destruc-
tion that, in the view of many distinguished naval men and 
writers upon maritime subjects, the hour of great battleships had 
struck ; to build them was no longer worth while. The people in 
France who favored this decision formed a large and influential 
group. vVhat would haYe occurred if war had broken out at the 
moment of this fever in favor of torpedo boats? Evidently, if 
use had been made of them as arbitrarily as of the submarines by 
the Germans the damage caused by the torpedo boats would per-
haps have been less; but what is· certain is that in many respects 
the conditions surrounding them were analogous to those affecting 
submarines. 
" However, the search for means to oppose the torpedo boat was 
undertaken. And now not only has this small craft ceased to be 
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an object of special dread but it has developed into the destroyer 
or flotilla leader and has been found to be the greatest engine of 
war against the submarine. In this way the instrument of terror-
of 40 years ago has shown itself to be an especially efficacious 
"defender of human.ity. 
" "\Vho says that the same thing will not come to pass in the 
case of the submarine? We note as a menace which impresses 
itsel.f greatly upon our minds the advent of powerful airships 
whose appearance each day strikes us as more real and more im-
posing. "\Ve foresee that they ·will be capable not only of attacks 
on land, at present almost irresistible, but also of formidable un-
dertakings far out at sea. In the course of these struggles the 
airship can spread gas over a considerable area of the sea, para-· 
lyzing large ships, possibly squadrons. ·Then . will we not look 
forward to utilizing the protection of the submarine which, sup-
plied with powerful means against aircraft, may circle around 
and guard the fleet? The capacity of submerging would enable· 
these guardians temporarily to escape the blows o~ the adversary 
in the air. This you will say to-day is fanciful. Perhaps the· 
future will show what the result will bB. 
"Be that as it may, the last war has shown that hereafter the· 
naval warfare can be carried on simultaneously under water, on 
the surface, and in the air. That is to say, we must, for the mo-
ment, consider the naval war of the future from this angle, if 
this greatest of misfortunes should, contrary to the wishes of all,. 
son1e day occur. 
" These are actual facts from which there is no possible escape. 
X one of you ·would know how to undertake to stop the progress· 
of human ingenuity. It has taken possession of· the submarine· 
domain. This is a fact which we are unable to prevent. 
" It is very certain that the submarine, the only device by 
\Vhich man has succeeded in navigating under water, can not yet 
sen·e any industrial purpose or peaceful aim. This characteristic· 
it shares with the torpedo boat and with most other weapons. 
"I have set forth the views of the French Navy relative to the· 
suvpression of submarines. I have still a word to say on the 
importance o~ the number of submarines. 
"The figures which have been laid before the committee have· 
emphasized the paramount consideration which must guide it in. 
forming an opinion. . 
"Lord Lee has stated that the Germans constructed 320 sub-
marines and that generally they liad only ten of them in active 
service at sea at any one time. This would indicate that the· 
proposals for submarines to be constructed must be estimated on 
a basis considerably larger than that employed in fixing the num-
ber of these little boats that it is thought necessary to use. 
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"'In truth, we have not quite the same figures. We have esti-
·nated that on an average one can figure that the Germans had 
nossessed 80 to 100 completed submarines which at the time 
~ould be termed in existence. Of this number they were able to 
keep about 15 or 20 at sea at once. And the reduction thus noted 
from the number of existing submarines to the number in condi-
tion to use was due to two causes-the need to allow the crews 
... to rest, and the need of maintenance of these small boats on ·which 
the wear and tear was terrific, making constant repairs necessary. 
"The advisory committee, whose perfectly clear, exact, and 
precise report could be considered as an excellent base for esti-
mating, had calculated 90,000 tons to be the tonnage necessary 
for the United States and Great Britain. No doubt that had been 
the limit of reLluction \Vhich those wise men had considered rea-
sonable. Taking it that one of the present submarines and, a 
fortiori, a submarine of a future type, an improvement on its 
predecessors, should have a tonnage of about 1,000 tons, the 
figures proposed by the American committee represent 90 sub-
marines of recent type; that is to say, 15 or 20 capable of simul-
taneous action. This seems indeed the minimum submarine 
strength a power desirous of making use of this contrivance 
should have. 
"It is proposed, however, to reduce this already very smal~ 
number. If we fall below this limit, we will end by having a force 
·Of no use whatsoever, and this measure will be nearly equivaleut . 
to abolishing the submarine. I think that in this conference we 
should at all costs abstain from making decisions which may not 
be practicable and which, even before our thoughts are on the 
way to realization, may ·weaken these to the- point that instead 
·Of being an element of moral strength and confidence to the 
world the decisions of the conference might be a cause of doubt 
and anxiety. 
" My observation on the decrease of the tonnage seems to me 
all the better founded in that it applies more forcibly in the case 
.of the construction of submarines of a greater tonnage, the free-
dom to build which has been asked for by most of us. 
"Never has the program of navies gone forward more rapidly 
than now. It will lead us before long to increase the size of the· · 
submarine. 
'' We are convinced that the idea of large-sized submarine~ 
eould not be dismissed. If you impose too narrow a limit on sub-
, marine tonnage, you will obstruct the progress of submarine 
science. What you \Vould accomplish on the one hand you would 
undo on the other. 
"To draw a conclusion from th~ foregoing, I think that we can 
not reasonably limit submarine tonnage, since we have before us 
fln entirely new weapon, concerning which no one of us can fore-
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see the possible trasformation and growth, perhaps in the near . 
future. 
"If, in spite of this idea-which is a menace to no one, first, 
because I think no one here can consider that any one of us 
could become the enemy of any other, and, secondly, because we 
can agree in mutual confidence to keep each other informed of 
our future constructions-you wish absolutely to fix a limit to 
submarine tonnage, I believe that 90,000 tons is the absolute 
minimum for all the navies ·who may want to have a submarine 
force." 
1\fr. Balfour said: " Since the 'very remarkable statement of 
the antisubmarine case made by Lord Lee, two notable contribu-
tions have been made to this debate. One was the document 
which you, 1\fr. Chairman, read out yesterday representing the 
views of the American advisory committee. The other was the 
speech of the gallant admiral who has just sat down. I rather 
wish that the advisory committee could have heard that speech 
before they drew up their report. They had reached the conclu-
sion that the destruction of commerce by submari:iJ.es, was not the 
legitimate business of submarines, and they were under the im-
pression that regulations could be framed which would prevent 
what they held to be the inhuman employment of this particular 
weapon of war. But had they heard the speech to which we have 
just listened they would have seen, I think, that while Admiral de 
Bon condemned, a.s we should all expect him to condemn, the mis-
use of the submarine against merchant ships, it was the action 
of submarines upon merchant ships which he regards as, on 
the whole, the most important purpose to which that weapon of 
maritime warfare can be put. And is he not right? Is there any 
man who knows what occurred in the late war; is there any man 
who knows what must occur in the course of any future war, 
who doubts that if submarines are sent on their dangerous and 
difficult mission-one of the most difficult and most dangerous, 
as well as one of the most disagreeable tasks which can be im-
posed upon sailors-it is for something more important than the 
remote chance of destroying son1e well-guarded ship of war? 
Is there any man who doubts that if they are once let loose to 
deal with merchantmen their powers will not in the stress of 
war be abused in the fUture as they have been so grossly abused 
in the past? It is vain to dwell upon the fact that the submarine 
is a useful scout, that the subn1arine may destroy a few un-
guarded and careless ships of· war and impose upon any attack· 
ing forces precautions which no doubt they \Voulcl gladly forego. 
" From Admiral de Bon's own speech it is clear that the main 
object they serve is the destruction of commerce ; and I can not 
douht tba t if this had been heard and thoroughly considered by 
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the advisory committee, the conclusion they would have come to 
would not have been so very remote from that which has im-
pressed itself upon the British Empire delegation. Now, I do 
not in the least desire unduly to minimize the utility of sub-
nlarines for genuine war purposes, but I can not help thinking 
that Admiral de Bon has exaggerated it. I can assure him that 
he is in error in supposing that the immunity from attack en-
joyed by the German coasts was, in the least degree, due to their 
submarines. I speak with knowledge upon this subject, and I 
can assure him that he is under some misapprehension. Neither 
do I believe that you will find that submarines, on the whole, are 
any defense against attack by ships of war upon an undefended 
coast town. That is, I believe, one of the duties which the Italian 
delegation think _can be performed by submarines, but I _greatly 
doubt it. The Germans were able from time to time, without 
much difficulty, to send a swift ship across the North Sea, throw 
a few shells into an undefended port, and then seek safety in 
flight. That produced some suffering and effected some destruc-
tion, though whether the cost of the damage done by a shell is 
greater than the cost of the shell itself may perhaps be doubted. 
I remember one particular case in which an attack of this kind 
was made upon an open town on the east coast of England where 
there actually was a·submarine; but it takes some time for a sub-
marine to get ready; it takes some time for it to submerge; it 
is difficult for it to reach a much swifter surface vessel; and, 
though the submarine did its best, the aggressor was far away 
before anything could be done either in the way of protection or 
revenge. 
"Is it not in the minds of all of us who followed the history of 
the late war that the British ships bombarded hour after hour the 
Flemish coast of Zeebrugge, which was full of submarines? The 
damage these submarines inflicted was trifling, and they never 
checked the bombardment. Take the case of the Dardanelles. 
We lay opposite the Dardanelles, in the most perilous circum-
stances you could well conceive, month after month, with subma-
rines ever on the watch seeking what they could destroy. What 
they destroyed was quite insignificant. Now, if submarines could 
not render it impossible for ships to lie in the onen opposite the 
Dardanelles, how can we believe that they are going to prove a 
very efficient weapon to maritime defense? I do not wish to 
dwell further upon this aspect of the question, because I do not 
think, as I have already indicated, that it is the fighting use of 
the submarine which is really before us now. The question before 
us now is whether you are going to encourage an instrum~nt of 
war which, if it be encouraged, if indeed it be permitted at all, 
will undoubtedly be used in the illegitimate destruction of com..: 
merce. Now, who is that going to injure? There are two of the 
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powers represented here who, I think, have little or nothing to 
fear in such a connection. I mean the United States and Japan. 
Both are remote from any possible aggressor, and the United 
States are self-sufficient. How about the other ' three? 
" Take the case of Italy. Italy is not an island, but for the 
purposes of this debate she almost counts as an island. I re-
member the extren1e difficulty we had in supplying her even with 
the minimum of coal necessary to keep her arsenals and manu-
factories going during the war. I doubt whether she could feed 
herself or supply .llerself or continue as an efficient fighting unit 
if she "·ere really blockaded, if her sea commerce were cut off, 
which, please God, " ·ill never be. The fact that you are going 
to give a general blessing to submarines-at least so I gather-
puts it in the po·wer of every State that has a seaboard at all 
to make itself a formidaple, aggressive enemy. You talk of the 
submarine as if it were by nature something that encouraged 
defense and discouraged attack. It is nothing of the kind. A 
State which is itself not dependent upon sea-}?orne commercep 
but which has some access to the sea, can, without building a 
battleship, without having any great naval estimates, make itself 
one of the most formidable of aggressive powers to its maritime 
· neighbors. Italy has five neighbors in the 1\1editerranean. I 
hope and believe that peace, eternal peace, will reign in those 
ancient homes of civilization. But we are con.sidering these mat- · 
ters from, as it were, the cold and calculating point of view of . 
some member of a general staff. He, looking at the problem with-
out any political bias, merely as a question of strategy, would 
say to Italy, 'You have five neighbors, each one of which can, if 
it desired it, blockade your coast without employing a single· 
surface ship.' No troops need be landed, no battles fought. You 
·would perish without being conquered. Now, compare with this 
case the case ·of France. France is nearly self-supporting in point 
of food, and France has a great land frontier which gives her 
access, directly and · indirectly, to all the great markets of the· 
world. No maritime po,ver can blockade her. But though se-
cure from the sea, l\lr. Briand tells us that she is in a position. 
of very grave insecurity on the side of the land, and he certainly 
indicated to an attentive world that France not only required a 
large army now but as events develop she might again call for 
a ssistance from overseas, across the Atlantic . or across the· 
Channel. 
"How, then, shall we think of this encouragement of sub-
marines, these passionate declarations against any interference 
"\Vith the development of this promising .weapon of war which is 
still in its infancy? The submarines which the French propose-
to build will be no protection against the submarines of Germany~ 
On what, then, is she going to rely? On the trawlers and fisher-
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men of her O\vn coasts? If the experience of the past is any guide 
to the future, these \vill be wholly insufficient. At a moment 
when everything turned upon keeping op~n the communications 
between France, Britain, and the United States the contribution 
of small craft to this vital object was as follows: France, 257 
vessels; Italy, 288 vessels; Great Britain, 3,676 vessels. These 
figures speak for themselves; and it is manifest that but for the 
assistance given by British travvlers, fishermen, and merchant sea-
n1en the exclusion from Italy of the necessities of national exist-
ence, the exclusion from France of the allied armies and munitions 
vvould have been complete, and the war would have been lost. 
Supposing now that the ·situation which I hfive just described 
were reproduced, as 1\I. Briand fears that it may be -produced_; 
supposing that France's allies come to her assistance, as I hope 
they will; is it not clear that France will again be as dependent 
on British antisubmarine craft as she was three or four years 
ago? Is this a tolerable situation? I can not believe that on re-
flection our French friends will think so. This is a conference 
for the diminution of naval armaments, and surely it is fitting 
that we should remember not merely that the submarine is an 
instrument of warfare certain to be abused but that the build-
ing of them in large numbers inflicts a double burden on the 
\Vorld-a burden on the country which possesses them and a 
burden also on the countries against which they may poss.ibly be 
used. 
-"Think not, however, that I am making any appeal of a purely 
national character. People are apt to suppo.se that Great Britain 
is the country which has most to fear from submarine warfare. 
They look at the map; they see that Great Britain is wholly 
dependent on sea-borne supplies and that opposite her coasts are 
harbors over which she has no control flanking the long lines 
of commercial communication which connect her with distant 
parts of her own En1pire, with the markets which she serves, 
and the countries from which she draws her raw material. They 
argue that a country so s.ituated is at the mercy of submarine 
warfare. 
"Now, it is true that our position has its strategical difficulties; 
but we have faced them before; we have faced them successfully; 
and if ever the necessity should arise we shall face them suc-
cessfully again. Lord Lee yesterday called attention to the 
critical moment of the war. I remember it well, for I was conl-
ing over to this country, ~nd daily we received by wireless the 
returns of our loss of 1nerhant tonnage. A very simple calculation 
sufficed to show that if this state of things continued the war 
would end in tragedy. In the struggle between the attack by sub-
marines and the defense, the attack was winning. All such 
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,struggles, however, have their ups and clowns, and ·this was the 
Yery nadir of our fortunes. But it brought its own remedy. 
Cou'rage, invention, and organization did their work, and months · 
before the end of the war on land piracy at sea had lost its 
terrors. And so it will be again if the necessity should arise. 
'Ve shall know how to protect oursel Yes, and if need be · we shall 
know how to protect our allies. But when those allies themselves 
m:ultiply their Heets of subn1arines at our very doors we know 
not what to think of a position so incongruous and so strange. 
" But there are considerations to be kept in mind which are 
w~der even than the most important international relations-con-
siderations of hun1anity, considerations of public morality. Ad-
miral de Bon observed just now that the submarine must develop. 
You could not, he observed, stop the progress of invention. I 
confess that, in so far as the progress of invention consists in 
devising new methods of warfare, I would stop it to-morrow if 
I could; and this conference could not do better work than to 
stop it in so far as it can be stopped. And, surely, if the powers 
represented in this room set themselves resolutely to the task, 
the submarine could be banned. I believe the conscience of man-
kind would help us; I believe the public opinion of the world 
would be on our side; and tile result of our labors would be ap-
proved, not merely by those who wish to diminish the burden 
of excessiYe taxation, but by those who believe that, if the pos-
sibility of war must be admitted, we should do something to 
make it more humane." 
Senator Schanzer said: "vVe have listened with the greatest 
attention to l\Ir. Balfour's important speech. 
"l\Ir. Balfour has recalled England's efficient aid for Italy's 
supplies during the war. I wish in the first place to express to 
the British delegate, who represents his country with such a great 
authority, Italy's sincere gratitude. 'Ve shall never forget wliat 
England has done: and Mr. Balfour knows the cordial friendship 
for England which is traditional among the Italian people and 
constitutes one of the surest bases of all Italian policy. 
" I wish furthermore to express to l\1r. Balfour my thanks also 
for the important remarks he made on the particular conditions 
of Italy, which depends completely on the sea for her supplies, 
which can be blockaded with the greatest facility owing to the 
fact that the l\Iediterranean is like a lake, and which can be ex-
posed to an offensive action on the part of as many as five mari· 
time neighbors. His observations are such as to justify, better 
than I could ever have done myself, the position that the Italian 
delegation has assumed in the present debate. 
" Mr. Balfour has contested the utility of the submarine for 
coast defense. He maintains that submarines are of no help in 
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guaranteeing the supplies of a country which is dependent on the 
sea, and holds, o'n the other hand, that they are a menace to thes~ 
" supplies. He has said that submarines are a_ danger, espeCially 
for Italy, whose coasts can be easily blockaded and whose mari-
time neighbors might make use of submarines as an offensive 
weapon. We are confronted by a substantial technical difference 
of opinion. Your authority and that of Lord Lee's are no doubt 
very great, but there are technical experts of great authority 
who insist upon the necessity of still maintaining submarines as 
a defensive weapon. This opinion is' shared by our naval experts 
and by our Government. 
"We are disposed, howeYer, to pursue together with you tbe 
study of this problem; only we must point out that it does not 
seem possible to us to-day to decide on the suppression of sub-
marines because many of the States that could avail themselves 
of this dangerous weapon are not represented in this conference. 
" Were we to decide to-day the suppression of submarines we 
would evidently be placing ourselves in a dangerous condition of 
manifest inferiority in respect to those States which are not rep-
resented here and which might continue to use submarines. The 
Italian delegation belieYes, therefore, that this problem must be 
examined subsequently in a wider conference. For the present, 
however, one point is clear in our minds, and that is that the best 
course would be to follow even in this case the spirit of the 
American proposal and consequently to limitate submarines to 
the measure strictly necessary for the ends 'of a purely defensive 
naval policy." 
Admiral de Bon asked the committee for a moment's attention. 
An error, he said, had been made which might be corrected by a 
moment's reference to the minutes. Contrary to what Mr. Bal-
four seemed to believe, he had never stated that it was permis-
sible to use submarines to destroy commercial vessels. He had 
said that the Germans, during the war, had used them in an un-
necessary and cruel manner, but he had never said that France 
intended to use them in any similar practice; it had never en-
tered into his thesis that submarine war on commerce was right 
or permissible. He said he hoped that the minutes would make 
this point clear. To sum up, he had said the Germans might have 
used the submarine less barbarously; that did not mean that he 
intended to preach barbarity himself. 
Mr. Balfour said that the last thing he had intended was to 
misrepresent Admiral De Bon. He was certain that if the ad-
miral ever had control of a navy in time of war he would conduct 
the operations in accordance with the dictates of humanity and 
the fine traditions of the great service to which he belonged. 
What he had attempted to show, however, was that, if the sub-
marine was to play the great rOle in future wars which Admiral 
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de Bon had suggested in his speech it could only do so by resort-
ing to extreme methods, for it was futile to suppose that subma-
rines would n1ake a practice of stopping merchant ships and plac-
ing prize crews on board to take them into port. 
Senator Schanzer asked permission to inquire with respect to 
the Christmas holiday .. He said he had been informed that there 
would be a recess until Tuesday after Christmas, and asked 
\Yh_ether it was correct that a meeting would be held on Tuesday 
afternoon. 
The chairman stated that as the servant of the conference he 
did not feel at liberty to recommend any Christmas recess· unless 
this ·was the expressed desire of the delegates. lie said that if 
in the judgment of the delegates the conference had arrived at a 
point where progress could be made, he ·would suggest that a 
meeting be- held the following morning. If at that meeting a 
point should be reached where further immediate progress might 
be made, a meeting could be held the following Monday. This, 
he said, could be decided according to circumsta~ces. 
The chairman then referred to the question of the public 
statement for the press and asked whether it would be agreeable 
to the French and British Empire delegations to pu~lish in full 
the arguments of· Admiral de Bon and l\1r. Balfour. This was 
agreed to by these delegations. 
The meeting then adjourned until the following morning, De-
cember 24, 1921, at 11 o'cl?ck. 
SEVENTH MEETING-SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1921, 11 A. M. 
PRERENT. 
Unitecl States.-l\Ir. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. 
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright and 
1\Ir. Clark. 
Briti8h EmpiTe.-l\1r. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), l\Ir. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley. 
France.-l\Ir. Sarraut, l\1r. Jusserand, Vice Admjral de Bon. 
Al'companied by Mr. I{ammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, 
1\lr. Ponsot. 
Italy.-Senator Sc!lanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber-
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Vis-
conti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. 
Celesia eli Vegliasco. 
